Preface: I understand that this is a very specific philosophical paper. I have left information regarding Rawls' argument on my page if you are not familiar. That way you should be able to follow the paper. I have written many papers on Rawls and since I find his argument weak (and at times absurd) they are all critical papers. This is no exception. Please enjoy.

Rawls presents an argument that claims that, in the original position, a rational person chooses the difference principle over any other conception of justice. I briefly outline the argument below. I intend to focus on Rawls' second premise, which states that maximin guarantees that we reach a certain point at which we do not value more primary goods very much. I believe this premise is fundamentally flawed in that there does not seem to be a point at which we do not desire more. Additionally, even if there is such a threshold, it is unclear that maximin can guarantee that we reach this point. Rawls may respond by appealing to contentious claims concerning human nature, and though they are controversial, I will give Rawls the benefit of the doubt. A further problem I intend to raise is that this premise is inconsistent with Rawls' reliance on incentives.

Rawls believe it is most rational to choose the difference principle from the original position. This conclusion is reach by appealing to three separate claims. First, the veil of ignorance prevents us from knowing the probabilities involved in the distribution of goods. Second, there is a certain threshold (henceforth called "X") at which we care very little about exceeding. Finally, we will not choose a situation in which it is possible that the outcome will be intolerable. Given these three premises, it follows that maximin is the msot rational strategy for choosing principles, and maximin selects the difference principle. The bulk of the work in this argument is done by the second premise (henceforth called "(2)"), so this will be my focus.

Our intuitions about human nature tell us that we are never entirely satisfied with our current situation. This is in direct conflict with (2). Rawls relies on this threshold X being not only real but obtainable. However, I believe Rawls can respond to this. Psychology may tell us that though we desire more, gaining more does not make us happy. Rawls can claim that our desire for more is irrational. Since we are permitted knowledge of general psychology in the original position and are presumed to be rational, this response seems more plausible. A more pervasive problem is that maximin does not seem to guarantee X. Maximin is supposed to guarantee X because we live in a world of moderate scarcity. However, "moderate scarcity" applies to everything between extreme scarcity and abundance. At the low end of this spectrum, maximin can only guarantee survival free of constant struggle. Rawls may respond that this is point X, but this seem implausible. However, solving this debate requires empirical data from psychology and sociology, so I will give Rawls the benefit of the doubt and move to a greater problem.

Rawls wants to introduce inequalities in society that benefit that worst off. Rawls achieves this by offering the more talented individuals monetary incentives to work harder and benefit others. However, these incentives do not have any value if maximin guarantees X, and X is all we want. It seems that Rawls is stuck with a completely equal distribution. Rawls might respond by pushing the "very little" aspect of the premise, but this is dangerous. If large increases are available, we may be willing to take small risks for massive gains. For example, we will be tempted to play a sort of "original position" lottery in which we risk 1 primary good for 1000 primary goods.

Rawls provides a valid argument for the difference principle, but his second premise is contentious. Human nature seems to dictate that X does not exist; however, Rawls may call our desires irrational. It is an additional problem that, in some cases, maximin only guarantees us bare survival. Rawls may claim that this point is X, but this seems implausible. Finally, Rawls relies on offering incentives to those who can work to benefit society. However, (2) dictates that these incentives are not valued. Rawls may claim that they are slightly valuable, but this may commit Rawls to abandoning maximin.

This is in regards to Michael Walzer's (one of the leading philosophers in the field of war ethics) position on humanitarian intervention. Please enjoy and send any worthwhile comments directly to me.

Walzer argues that interfering in the affairs of a sovereign state is wrong, but when a state violates the rights of its people in heinous ways, intervention is permissible. Walzer leaves his argument at that, but some additional work has to be done. I intend to provide two arguments in support of Walzer. First, I suggest that when a state turns against its people, it is analogous to committing an aggression. Second, methodological individualism suggests that when a state violates the rights of its people, it violates its own rights, rendering the rights forfeit. I do not intend to argue that intervention is not permissible in the face of horrible atrocity. My worry is in the other direction and it is shared by Charles Beitz: there is no reason to think that the internal condition of a state has to reach that of massacre or enslavement to permit intervention. I intend to flesh out Beitz’s reasoning for thinking that the political autonomy of a community, or “communal integrity” as Beitz refers to it, (Beitz 1980, pp. 385) is not inherently valuable. I also provide an additional argument based on the nature of rights as voluntarily forfeitable, the right to communal integrity included. Instead of dwelling on Walzer’s arguments against Beitz, I intend to provide a stronger argument for Walzer to make based on a utilitarian calculation between the consequences of warfare and the rights violations committed by the state.

Walzer adamantly holds that a state has a right to political sovereignty, and that violating this right by means of intervention is wrong. However, when a governing body commits serious rights violations against its own people, it fails to be a politically sovereign community and forfeits its right to autonomy. At this point, intervention does not violate any right and it is therefore morally permissible (Walzer 1979, pp. 101-102). In order to head off any immediate concerns, some work must be done to explain why a state forfeits its own rights when it violates the rights of its own people. There are two plausible arguments that can be made. Consistent with Walzer’s claim that a response to aggression is the only just cause for war, we can see the state’s violation of its peoples’ rights as an internal aggression. Since the citizens of a state cannot typically take military action against the state, it is permissible for an outside state to intervene. A second argument comes from methodological individualism. The rights of a state are derived from the rights of its individual citizens. A state violating the rights of its people should be seen as a governing body violating the rights of the state. Under this interpretation, intervention does not violate the rights of the state at all, but instead it punishes an illegitimate governing body.

It seems clear that intervention in the face of inhumane atrocities is at the very least permissible, but Walzer’s restrictions on intervention are too strong. Walzer’s second premise is really to say that a state’s rights are forfeit only if the rights violation is a severely heinous act such as massacre or enslavement. If a state is only in relatively minor violation of the rights of its citizens, then intervention is not permitted. This seems strange. The idea is derived from Walzer’s claim that “the rights of contemporary men and women to live as members of a historical community and to express their inherited culture through political forms worked out among themselves” (Walzer 1980, pp. 211) are inherently valuable, and intervention violates these rights. Walzer provides a thought experiment in which one state brainwashes the members of another state, forcing them to accept new ideologies. Walzer appeals to our intuitions saying that this is clearly wrong, and he concludes that the violation of the second state’s communal integrity fuels our intuitions (Walzer 1980, pp. 226). Beitz disagrees. He provides a compelling counterexample in which the mayor of New York brainwashes his citizens into obeying New York by-laws. This is also intuitively wrong. However, in this case there is no communal integrity being violated because the act is being committed by the political community itself. This suggests that the individual integrity of each citizen is what is important in both cases, not the communal integrity (Beitz 1979, pp. 389-390). It is also doubtful that intervention necessarily violates communal integrity. Given the nature of rights, it is possible for an individual to willingly forfeit his rights at any time. Walzer sees communal integrity as a right, and there is no reason that an individual cannot give this right up as well. When a state is violating the rights of its citizens, they are likely willing to forfeit communal integrity regardless of whether the violation reaches the level of atrocity.

These arguments suggest that a defence of communal integrity is not the best route for Walzer to take. However, there is a stronger line that Walzer can use to defend his claim that only atrocities justify armed intervention. Armed intervention is a form of warfare, and warfare typically causes large amounts of death and other harms. When a state violates the rights of its people, this also typically causes harm. However, the harms are usually less intense than those caused by war. Walzer can appeal to a utilitarian calculation of harms, and when the harms caused by the state’s violation of rights outweigh the harms caused by warfare, intervention is justified. Walzer can continue to argue that due to the extremely high cost of war, the only rights violations that can possibly be more severe than war are atrocities such as massacre and enslavement. Whether or not this is true is an empirical matter.

Walzer persuasively argues that when a state violates the rights of its people, it forfeits its own rights to political autonomy. When this occurs, it is permissible to intervene in the state`s affairs on humanitarian grounds. However, Walzer also claims that the violation of rights must be severe to the point of atrocity to justify intervention. This is based on his idea of communal integrity, which states that it is valuable for citizens to have a historical and cultural rootedness in their political community. Walzer provides an example that is intended to show the intuitive nature of this idea, but Charles Beitz provides a counterexample that suggests that we value individual integrity, not communal integrity. Furthermore, since communal integrity is seen as a right, it can be willingly forfeited by the citizens of a state. In cases of a state violating the rights of its people, this is likely to occur. Walzer`s defence of communal integrity seems weak, but he can still hold that only atrocities can justify intervention. A utilitarian calculation will show that warfare is extremely costly, and that only extremely harmful violations of rights outweigh the costs of war. Under this interpretation, only harmful acts such as massacre and enslavement can justify armed intervention.

Works Cited:
Beitz, Charles. “Nonintervention and Communal Integrity,” Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 9(4), 1980, pp. 385-391.
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books, 1979, pp. 101-
102.
Walzer, Michael. “The Moral Standing of States: A Response to For Critics,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9(3), 1980, pp. 209-229.

I welcome any comments regarding my representation of Walzer's argument, my objection to Walzer, and my proposed defence. I do realize that Walzer would not like my defence, but I see that as a mistake on his part. Please enjoy.

Walzer argues that though engaging in war for an unjustified cause is morally wrong, the soldiers who participate cannot be blamed for fighting the war. Walzer claims that soldiers who engage in unjust war are either coerced or made ignorant of morally relevant facts, and this is sufficient to render the soldiers excusable. I intend to show that though the argument stands in cases of moral ignorance, the presence of coercion is not enough to absolve soldiers of responsibility. I argue that our intuitions produce a false dissociation between a soldier who harms another to prevent his own harm and an individual who harms another for his own profit. If there is no morally relevant difference between preventing harm and producing a gain of equal magnitude, then are intuitions are wrong in one case. The only objective way to make a decision in either case is to weigh the gains and losses. I intend to reply on behalf of Walzer by appealing to the “in Bello” criteria of war. If soldiers conduct war in a manner that minimizes harm, then it may be permissible for soldiers to engage in war.

Walzer is willing to admit that engaging in a war for an unjust cause is morally wrong. However, Walzer also claims that soldiers who engage in war are not blameworthy. Their actions are wrong but they are also excusable. Walzer’s argument hinges on the claim that when an individual performs a morally wrong action because he is coerced or excusably ignorant of moral considerations, he is excused for his action (Walzer, 1977: pp. 39-40). Since soldiers are always subject to coercion or forced into ignorance, soldiers are never to blame for engaging in war. It is clear that this is too strong a claim; some soldiers are fully aware of all the morally relevant facts involved in war and they still freely choose to engage in war. I will not give this too much thought, because it does not weaken Walzer’s conclusion in any interesting way. Soldiers may not always be excusable, but they are still often not to be blamed. It also seems clear that when soldiers are made ignorant of relevant information, and especially when soldiers are deceived on such matters, that they should not be blamed for engaging in war. As such, I will not object to Walzer on this point. Walzer’s controversial premise is that being coerced into war absolves soldiers of responsibility.

It seems intuitively true that soldiers coerced into war should not be blamed for their actions. States can make a number of threats to soldiers who do not choose to engage in war: soldiers may be arrested for treason, made into social outcasts, or in extreme cases even put to death. Soldiers go to war to prevent significant harm to themselves, and this excuses their actions. If we suppose that this is true, then it follows that we are morally permitted to cause harm to others in order to prevent harm to ourselves. However, suppose I attack an individual passing by on the street in order to take his wallet. In this case, I am causing harm to another in order to benefit myself. This is seen as a morally wrong action. If this is true, then it follows that I am not morally permitted to harm others in order to produce a gain for myself. Now suppose that some evil third party has stolen my money and will only return it to me if I attack the individual passing by on the street. In this case I am performing a morally wrong action to prevent (or reverse) a loss, but it is more evident that my action is not excusable. These examples illuminate the strange dissociation in our intuitions between preventing harm and producing gain for ourselves as moral justifications. This dissociation is unfounded; the difference between -1 and 0 is the same as the difference between 0 and 1. In this light, it is unclear whether coercion excuses a soldier of responsibility for engaging in war.

It is not obvious which side of the dissociation is incorrect. The only relevant difference between engaging in war and the two assault cases seems to be that gaining or preventing the loss of some amount of money is less severe than the threats made to uncooperative soldiers. Walzer may claim that this explains the dissociation. However, this seems unclear. The harm caused by engaging in war is often very high, and the consequences of refusing to engage may not be very severe. The injuries that are suffered by the victim in the assault cases are very often dwarfed by the pain a single soldier can inflict in war. Walzer needs to show that the harm the soldier prevents outweighs the harm that he causes by engaging in war. This will make the soldier’s actions excusable and possibly even justified. This seems to be the role of the “in Bello” criteria in just-war theory. When war is performed according to the “in Bello” criteria, the harm caused by engaging in war is minimized. It is possible that the harm is reduced to a level below the harm that threatens non-complacent soldiers. If this is the case, then soldiers who adhere to the “in Bello” rules are justified in going to war. Soldiers are not responsible for the decision to initiate war.

Walzer argues that soldiers are at least very often coerced into engaging in unjust wars. He argues that whenever this is the case, soldiers must be excused for deciding to fight for an unjust cause. This is consistent with some of our intuitions, but it is inconsistent with others. Soldiers are permitted to go to war under coercion because they are permitted to protect themselves from harm when they are threatened by another harm. However, we do not excuse those who harm others for their own personal gain. Since there is no relevant difference between preventing harm and producing gain, one of our intuitions must be wrong. However, Walzer may reply by stipulating that soldiers must adhere to “in Bello” criteria in order to reduce to consequences of war below the severity of the consequences facing a non-complacent soldier. If this is the case, the engaging in war is excusable.

Note: the references refer to Walzer's 1979 book entitled "Just and Unjust Wars".

I welcome any comments and/or criticisms. Please note that this is ONLY in regards to Kant's universal law method, not his ends/means method. A step-by-step breakdown of Kant's argument is posted on my page. Please enjoy.

Consider the following maxim: out of self-love, I kill myself because my future is extremely unpleasant. Kant argues that this maxim is morally wrong, since if it is made a universal law then there will be a contradiction in the conception of self-love. When the maxim is universalized, the purpose of self-love is to both preserve and shorten life, which is impossible. However, Kant’s argument is not very compelling. Kant relies on the assumption that the purpose of self-love is to preserve life. More plausibly, the purpose of self-love is to increase pleasure, and this may not produce a contradiction. I intend to show that Kant can reply to this by defining the purpose of pleasure as the preservation of life. There are three arguments to support this claim: pleasure motivates life, pleasure is evolutionarily adaptive, and pleasure can improve health. However, this only allows Kant to forbid suicide when it is motivated by self-love. I intend to show that Kant cannot produce a contradiction when suicide is motivated by self-hatred or altruism.

Kant argues that committing suicide out of self-love when the future looks unpleasant is morally wrong because if the maxim cannot be willed to be a universal law. Self-love ends up with two contrary purposes. If the maxim is universalized, then the purpose of self-love is to shorten life , at least when the continuation of life is not desirable. However, Kant argues that the purpose of self-love is to preserve life . This leads to the conclusion that, if the maxim is universalized, the purpose of self-love is to both shorten and preserve life. The maxim results in a contradiction in conception. As such, acting on the maxim violates a perfect duty. The main problem is in premise (3), since Kant simple presupposes that the purpose of self-love is to preserve life. It seems much more plausible that the purpose of self-love is to increase pleasure. If this is the case, then in the face of an extremely unpleasant future self-love may very well guide you to commit suicide. More importantly, it is very unclear how Kant can provide a contradiction between increasing pleasure and shortening life. At first it may seem counterintuitive that you can increase your pleasure by ending your life; however, in cases such as those involving painful terminal illness, the concept does not seem so farfetched.

However, it is too quick to dismiss Kant’s argument. Premise (3) may be maintained if we define the purpose of pleasure as preserving very life. If this holds, then it does not matter that the purpose of self-love is to increase pleasure, because this will reduce to the purpose of preserving lives. The argument runs as a sort of hypothetical syllogism of purposes. We have three arguments that the purpose of pleasure is to preserve life. First, pleasure motivates the continuation of life. This seems to be true simply by merit of the feeling of pleasure, and it is supported by Kant’s claim that we may be motivated to commit suicide when our future is void of pleasure. Second, pleasurable actions seem to be evolutionarily adaptive. For instance, pleasurable food is generally healthy(1) , and sexual reproduction is exceptionally pleasurable. Finally, psychological studies on moods and emotions also show that happiness is correlated with positive health outcomes. If the purpose of pleasure is to preserve life, then Kant’s argument can still produce a contradiction in conception.

Whether or not the purpose of pleasure is to preserve life, Kant’s argument may be restricted in substantial ways. Kant’s goal seems to be to forbid suicide in all cases, but his argument is not strong enough to do so. Even though Kant may be able to forbid suicide motivated by self-love, there are two alternative motivations that seem exceptionally problematic. First, Kant cannot forbid suicide motivated by self-hatred. Suppose your future will be extremely pleasurable, but you do not think that you deserve such pleasure. You kill yourself as a result. It is very unclear how Kant can possibly derive a contradiction from this maxim. Kant may try to twist the purpose of self-hatred in some way, but it is unlikely that the purpose will be in conflict with the purpose of shortening life. Another problematic maxim is to commit suicide in order to benefit others. Suppose there is a trolley hurtling towards five people, and unfortunately there is no alternative track that I can turn the trolley onto. I choose to throw myself in front of the trolley, which saves the five people. Again it is unclear how Kant can produce a contradiction. Kant wants to argue that not committing suicide is a perfect duty and that helping others is only an imperfect duty, but this seems like a mistake in light of suicide situations that Kant must permit.

There are two possible consequences for Kant. First, it may be the case that Kant simply has to permit suicide in some cases, such as those motivated by self-hatred or altruism. Kant’s method of only committing actions that you can will to be a universal law may be an accurate method, but Kant has surely misapplied it in these cases. The stronger claim driven by the intuition that suicide is wrong is that Kant’s method is not a useful method. I do not want to rely strictly on the intuition that suicide is wrong, so I will not make this claim. However, I will suggest that if the other maxims Kant rejects are also misapplications, and if the rejection of these maxims is strongly intuitive, then Kant’s method is not acceptable. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper; however we do have enough to say that Kant must permit suicide in some cases.

Kant provides an argument that forbids committing suicide out of self-love. If the maxim is universalized, then the purpose of self-love is to both preserve and to shorten life; this is conceptually impossible. However, it seems more likely that the purpose of self-love is to increase pleasure, not to preserve life. Kant may respond by arguing that the purpose of pleasure is to preserve life. The purpose of self-love then reduces to the preservation of life. Kant can provide biological and evolutionary reasons why this may be true. Though this allows Kant to forbid suicide motivated by self-love, Kant must permit suicide driven by alternative motivations such as self-hatred or altruism. It is unclear how Kant can produce a contradiction in these cases. It may be the case that Kant’s method is good, but Kant misapplies his method in rejecting suicide. Alternatively, it may be the case that Kant’s method is not accurate, but this is a larger issue than is appropriate for this paper.

1) This has become false because of high-fat fast foods, but evolutionary experts convincingly argue that evolution moves much more slowly than our technological advances, and that finding these types of food pleasant will not be common as it becomes more maladaptive.

I welcome any comments, please enjoy.

Nearly all moral philosophers appeal to some moral intuition at some point in most of their arguments. However, Sinnott-Armstrong gives us a persuasive argument that we have good reason to doubt many of these moral intuitions. His argument is briefly outlined below; it relies on the notion that our moral intuitions can be influenced by morally irrelevant factors. If our intuitions can be influenced in such a way, it seems clear that they are not justified. Sinnott-Armstrong cites a variety of psychological literature to support his claim that moral intuitions are sometimes subject to what he refers to as “framing effects.” However, the claim that some of our intuitions are subject to these effects is not enough to derive Sinnott-Armstrong’s conclusion that all or most of our moral intuitions cannot be justified without inference. I intend to show that at the very least, moral intuitionists themselves are not likely to be subject to framing effects. Sinnott-Armstrong replies that the moral intuitionist is actually using inferences to reach his conclusions, but this seems unclear. Sinnott-Armstrong may be able to force an inference into the intuitionist argument, but I intend to show that this is a dangerous argument to make. Sinnott-Armstrong wants to claim that a moral inference must be derived from at least one morally-relevant premise, but the inferences he accuses the intuitionist of making are often non-moral. Since Sinnott-Armstrong does not want to accept moral scepticism, he must drop this restriction. If he does allow moral judgments to be inferred from non-moral premises, then his position becomes plausible but uninteresting since it does not attack any real position.

Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument runs as follows: if our intuitions concerning moral judgments are formed unreliably, and we should know this, then they are not justified. By definition, the influence of framing effects makes our intuitions unreliable. Sinnott-Armstrong cites psychological studies that indicate the existence of framing effects in the formation of some of our moral intuitions. For the purposes of this paper, I will ignore any potential empirical errors in these studies. It also seems clear that if we are in the business of making moral judgments, then we should know that these framing effects exist. Sinnott-Armstrong concludes that our moral intuitions are not justified, but this is too quick. The fact that some of our moral intuitions are subject to framing effects is not enough to claim that none of our moral intuitions are justified. Sinnott-Armstrong needs the claim that at least a very large proportion of our moral intuitions are unreliable. For instance, framing effects seem unlikely to be relevant in determining the plausibility of a prima facie duty. An even more problematic exception for Sinnott-Armstrong is that moral philosophers are likely reliable. Philosophers reflect long and hard on their intuitions, so it seems unlikely that they will be subject to framing effects. If we are working within the realm of normative ethics, this exception seems to remove framing effects from the entire relevant population.

Sinnott-Armstrong replies by claiming that the philosopher is making an inference at some point in reflecting on their intuition. This seems unclear, and it possibly begs the question by defining deep reflection as requiring an inference. However, Sinnott-Armstrong provides a compelling argument. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that at the very least, the moral intuitionist must know that his intuitions are reliable, and infer from this that his conclusions are correct. Sinnott-Armstrong provides an example in which you possess a number of colour-coded thermometers. One of the colours (in his example, blue) indicates 100% accuracy, while the other colours indicate lesser accuracy. Some other group of thermometers may even be wrong every time. Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim seems correct; the fact that the blue thermometers are always right is not enough to justify your belief in their reading unless you know that they are always accurate. In this sense, you require an extra inference of the form: “the blue thermometers are always accurate, therefore I can trust their reading.”

This argument may be dangerous for Sinnott-Armstrong. Early in his argument, Sinnott-Armstrong makes two claims: a moral inference is not adequately justified if none of its premises contain moral content , and if a premise contains moral content it must also be justified. However, the inferences that Sinnott-Armstrong accuses the intuitionist of making are from non-moral premises. If a moral inference cannot be justified using non-moral premises, it does not seem right to accuse the intuitionist of making such inferences. Regardless of how deeply they reflect, they are never justified. There are two roads that Sinnott-Armstrong can take, but it is unlikely that he will find either option appealing. First, he may just bite the bullet and admit that moral scepticism is correct. If every moral claim must be justified by another moral claim, then any moral argument will either regress infinitely or become circular. In either case, the argument will be invalid. Since, Sinnott-Armstrong is not a moral sceptic, he does not want to make this claim. Alternatively, Sinnott-Armstrong may drop the restriction that every moral claim must be inferred from at least on moral claim, while maintaining that they must be inferred in some way. However, while this may preserve his argument, it makes his argument entirely uninteresting. Any intuition must be supported by a number of epistemic assumptions. For instance, the intuition that we have a prima facie duty to keep our promises relies on understanding what a promise is, the existence of other people to make promises to, and so on. Under Sinnott-Armstrong’s restrictions, these count as inferences, but his position his not likely to bother the moral intuitionist. Sinnott-Armstrong can be accused of attacking a straw man, despite his early reassurance that he is not.

Sinnott-Armstrong provides empirical evidence that undermines the reliability of some of our moral intuitions. While Sinnott-Armstrong uses this premise to conclude that our moral intuitions are not justified, he requires a stronger premise. If Sinnott-Armstrong can show that a significant proportion of our moral intuitions are unreliable, then his argument seems to pose a problem for the intuitionist. However, it seems that the relevant intuitions are those of philosophers concerned with normative ethics, and they seem unlikely to be unreliable. Sinnott-Armstrong counters this case by claiming that each moral intuition the philosopher makes is actually made inferentially. Though this seems shaky, Sinnott-Armstrong can at least claim that the philosopher must know that his intuition is reliable, and infer the accuracy of the intuition from this premise. However, this premise is completely non-moral. If Sinnott-Armstrong maintains his restriction that moral inferences be made using at least one premise with moral content, he seems doomed to moral scepticism. If he drops this restriction, his argument becomes uninteresting. Since any intuition must be supported by many epistemic assumptions, Sinnott-Armstrong’s accusation of the intuitionist actually using an inference does not seem bothersome, and his position seems to lose meaning. The intuitionist can admit the use of an inference, but he remains free of moral inference.

I welcome any questions and comments. If there are any presupposed concepts that you are not familiar with, please let me know and I will attempt to clarify for you. Enjoy your reading.

Functionalism is one of the most popular theories of the mind, but it is certainly not without its problems and critics. Despite these flaws, functionalism is at least a very coherent theory that avoids many of the troubles inherent in identity theory and behaviourism. This point is argued very well in Hilary Putnam’s paper entitled “Psychological Predicates.” To the contrary, critics such as Ned Block pose difficult questions for Putnam and other functionalists in an attempt to “embarrass all versions of functionalism.” However, I do not believe that Block is successful in dismissing functionalism as a plausible theory of the mind. In this paper I intend to briefly explain the basic postulates of functionalism as a whole, and then to expose Putnam’s specific theory of functionalism. Putnam lays her groundwork by responding to some common objections concerning the identity of pain as a brain state. Putnam is successful in defeating these objections, but she also argues that “pain = brain state X” should not be taken to mean that pain and X are synonymous. This conclusion leads Putnam to create a functional theory called the “Probabilistic Automaton” theory. I intend to briefly explain Putnam’s comparisons between her theory, identity theory, and behaviourism. It is clear that Putnam’s theory avoids troubles that are crippling to identity theory and behaviourism. Block responds with two problematic examples that accuse functionalism of describing systems that clearly do not posses mentality as doing just that. Putnam can respond by accusing Block of violating her principle that a functional sentient being must not be able to be broken down into other sentient beings. However, I believe that Block has an adequate complain that this is unclear. The final section of this paper will describe Block’s “absent qualia” argument. I find the objection to be unsatisfactory in the light that it begs the question against functionalism.

According to the functionalist, brain states are not identical with mental processes, but instead mental processes are simply realized by brain states. Functionalism views the mind as analogous to a computer; the brain is the hardware and the mental processes are the software, and they work together to create a causal chain between input and output. In computer systems, different physical mechanisms can realize the same processes, and the same holds for minds. This defines mental processes as being multiply realizable, and it creates a very important distinction between the physical properties that realize the computation and the computation itself. The key postulate of functionalism is that we define higher-order (mental) properties in terms of the functional process or processes they perform. This is at odds with identity theory since identity theory defines a mental process as the physical mechanism that realizes it. Functionalism differs from behaviourism in that each piece of a functional network can only be defined in terms of the other functions in the network. For example, coordinates do not have any intrinsic definition when they exist alone, but when defined in terms of other sets of coordinates, they take on meaning. Behaviourism simply defines each individual function. This is a very broad picture of functionalism, and various versions of functionalism contain different subtle distinctions. Let us turn to Putnam’s theory of functionalism.

Putnam’s theory can be explained by referring to what she calls a “Probabilistic Automaton,” or a PA for short. Putnam derives her theory from a conclusion she makes about the nature of identity. Putnam wants to defend the claim that it is meaningful but not accurate to say that the property of pain is equal to a certain brain state X. Putnam responds successfully to three objections but she raises a concern of her own against the identity theorist. Some theorists may argue that pain cannot not equal X because we can know we are in pain without knowing we are in brain state X. However, Putnam points out that we can also know that an object is hot without know that it is in a certain state of kinetic energy. Other philosophers argue that an identity is only true when two properties possess the exact same physical location. In response, Putnam notes that when an image is reflected in a mirror, the location of the image should be said to be behind the mirror, but we do not seem to have a problem saying that the image is identical to the object. A final objection to the identity is that brain state X is merely correlated with the property of being in pain. Putnam’s argument is not fatal, but places a difficult task on the critic. We are willing to accept that “light = electromagnetic radiation” is a true identity, and Putnam claims that the onus is on the critic to explain why the identity “pain = brain state X” is relevantly different from the light identity. Putnam successfully defends identity theory up to this point, but poses a problem of her own: we consider temperature to be identical with molecular energy, but the two concepts are clearly not synonyms. This is all preliminary work that Putnam performs to lead to the claim that while the identity “pain = brain state X” is not fully accurate, pain can be identified as a certain functional state. This leads us to the Probabilistic Automaton theory.

Putnam defines a PA as any organism that can feel pain, and she sets certain restrictions that apply to every PA. First, every PA has at least one “Description,” which Putnam defines as any true statement claiming that the PA has distinct states X, Y, Z, and so on, that are related to inputs, outputs, and probabilities. This is to say that, given a certain input, there are a number of outputs that are determined by certain probabilities. Putnam also states that each Description requires that the PA under the Description is only in a certain state if the appropriate sensory inputs exist. In short, the sensory inputs are necessary for the state to occur. Putnam adds a final important restriction that no PA can be broken into smaller components that contain Descriptions. This theory has similar advantages as functionalism, especially over identity theory and behaviourism. Identity theory has the daunting task of attempting to locate a single, species-independent brain state that is both necessary and sufficient for any organism to be in a particular mental state. This seems likely to be impossible, while functionalism and the PA theory do not encounter this problem. Functionalism allows mental processes to be realized in different ways, and there is no PA restriction that each PA must have the same Descriptions that give rise to each output. The primary problem for Behaviourism is that it seems unlikely that a certain mental state will always give rise to the same behavioural disposition. Functionalism avoids this problem by defining each function in an all-things-considered manner, and PA theory avoids this problem by requiring that Descriptions always involve probabilistic factors to be taken into consideration. Putnam also claims that explaining X in terms of a certain disposition to act Y has little to do with the actual properties of X, but this seems both unclear and dangerous. I see no reason to assume that the behaviourist needs to define X as anything more than a disposition. More importantly, the same complaint can be levelled against any functionalist theory. However, Putnam’s first objection seems to be enough to dismiss behaviourism. Putnam’s arguments provide a strong case to accept functionalism over identity theory and behaviourism, but let us turn to Block’s arguments against functionalism to determine if we can fully accept the theory.

Block presents two examples that seem problematic for Putnam as well as functionalism in general. Both of Block’s examples involve systems that possess mentality as defined by functionalism. However, he maintains that it is absurd to say that either of the systems posses any mentality at all. Block’s first example runs as follows: imagine that you have a group of little men inside your head. Instead of your brain running on electrical impulses and neurotransmitters, the little men receive sensory inputs and produce the appropriate output. Functionalism defines this system of having mentality, while Block thinks it is clear that it possesses no such thing. While this example is not entirely intuitive to me, his second example seems much more problematic. Say for instance that the entire nation of China is linked by a (very) complex network of phones and satellites that allow the entire nation to receive inputs and produce the appropriate outputs. Though this seems implausible, it is certainly logically possible. The same problem arises; functionalism defines the system as having mentality, and this claim seems extremely counterintuitive.

At first glance, these examples are useless because they clearly violate Putnam’s restriction that a PA cannot be broken into components that have real Descriptions. However, Block rightfully accuses this restriction of being very unclear. Block claims that Putnam’s restriction cannot be read as saying that all of the PA’s components must not be sentient, because this excludes beings such as pregnant women and people infested with sentient parasites as possessors of mentality. Block’s examples contain both sentient and non-sentient components, so they do not actually violate Putnam’s restriction. Putnam may respond that the sentient parts must play a crucial role in the realization of the mental processes in order to require exclusion. Block produces a further counterexample: imagine there are sentient creatures that act as elementary particles. These creatures seemingly play a crucial role in all processes, whether they are mental or non-mental. Block does admit that these elementary particles do not directly influence the mental processes in the way that the little men or the Chinese citizens do, but it seems unclear how Putnam can distinguish between crucial and non-crucial components. It is not clear whether Putnam`s objection is valid, but fortunately a stronger objection can be made against Block.

Block’s examples rely on the notion of the absent qualia objection. The objection claims that “pain = functional state X” is incorrect, because we can imagine a system that satisfies the functional state but does not posses the qualitative sensation, or quale, of pain. This occurs in both of Block’s examples, as well as the well-known zombie argument. The zombie argument runs as follows: imagine a being that resembles you in every way and produces the exact same outputs as you do in response to certain inputs. In essence, the zombie possesses the same functional states as you possess. However, the zombie does not feel pain. This objection is generally seen as extremely problematic for the functionalist, but it may not be as strong as it seems. The goal of the functionalist is to define the entire mental process in terms of a functional system, and this presumably attempts to include the sensation of pain itself. However, if this is true, it seems that the absent qualia argument begs the question against the functionalist. The argument defines the sensation of pain as quale that is not part of a functional state. Admittedly, the onus is on the functionalist to provide a satisfactory account of the sensation of pain in terms of a functional system, but this does not seem impossible. We have no reason to straightforwardly reject functionalism based on the absent qualia argument.

Functionalism provides a theory of the mind that avoids the major problems that identity theory and behaviourism must face. By defining the mind in terms of a complete functional system that can be realized in multiple ways, functionalism avoids defining a process as a single brain state or in terms of a single disposition. This avoids many of the key problems with identity, as shown by Putnam’s argument for the Probabilistic Automaton theory. However, Block provides examples that seem contrary to functionalism. He provides two systems that are complete functional systems but seem to lack certain qualia. However, this seems to beg the question, since qualia are defined as sensations separate from functional states. There is still work to be done by the functionalist, but we have no grounds to reject the theory outright.

This is a brief response to paper by Alastair Norcross. I welcome any comments.

Norcross offers an account of utilitarianism that is free from the task of making an “ought” claim; this view is known as scalar utilitarianism. This form of utilitarianism merely ranks all possible actions in terms of the goodness that they produce, and avoids commanding us to perform the action at the top of the list. The avoidance of this commanding step is what makes scalar utilitarianism distinct from standard utilitarianism. Norcross’ main premise for excluding this step is as follows: defining the right action as the one that produces the most good as opposed to slightly less good is arbitrary. Norcross provides an example that indicates that the difference between one point below the maximum is the same as one point below any other point on the scale. First I intend to show that this example, as Norcross describes it, is inconsistent with utilitarianism. Norcross’ main error is claiming that the utilitarian adds extra value to an action that causes another person to reach their maximum independent of the net increase in good. Though this weakens Norcross’ argument, he can still show that there is a certain arbitrary nature to claiming the best action to be right and all other actions to be wrong. The remainder of the paper attempts to explain the special importance of the best action, and consequentially to describe the distinction between best and all others as non-arbitrary. The distinction is based on the existence of a higher-ranking action that does not apply to the best action.

Norcross provides an example involving two men each debating with themselves regarding how much money he should give to charity. Smith is debating between $9000 and $10000, and Jones is debating between $8000 and $9000 dollars. Norcross stipulates that the threshold (1) of good for each man is $10000. You are able to persuade one of the men to give the higher amount, but you only have time to speak with either Smith or Jones. Norcross claims that the utilitarian should be indifferent as to which man is convinced to give the maximum amount, and this seems correct. Norcross takes this to mean that setting a threshold for rightness (in this case, at $10000) is a mistake. However, Norcross is positing a special consideration that utilitarianism is simply not concerned with. The utilitarian does not add any extra value to an action that causes another person to produce maximal good; the utilitarian is only concerned with the action that results in the most good. In this case, you have two options, both of which produce an increase of $1000. Suppose you convince Jones to give $9000, and Smith also gives $9000. Jones and Smith have both failed to perform their utilitarian duty, but you have succeeded in performing your duty in either case. If Jones is debating between $7000 and $9000 dollars, persuading Jones is the clear choice because you will produce an increase of $2000 instead of $1000. This clarification weakens Norcross’ example, but the major issue is still whether defining the right action as the “best” action is arbitrary.

Norcross appeals to a race in which we arbitrarily award the top three runners with medals. Norcross seems to be correct in claiming that drawing the line between third and fourth is arbitrary (2). Norcross concludes that the line between first and second is equally as arbitrary, and that the same applies to actions. The line between the best action and the second best action drawn by utilitarianism is arbitrary. This is not as persuasive as calling the line between third and fourth arbitrary. There seems to be a distinct quality of the highest-ranking action that no other action possesses. Norcross’ claim seems appealing; if the distinction is just based on the number of actions ranking higher, then every action is distinct. The best action has 0 actions ranked higher, the next has 1 action ranked higher, the next has 2 actions ranked higher, and so on. However, this is not an accurate description of the distinction. The best action x can be described as ~ Eybx, (3) meaning there is no such action y that is better than action x. Every action ranked below the best action can be described as Eybx. In plain English, I can respond with “you can do something better” to every action except for the best action. This sets the best action apart from all others.

Norcross is not likely disturbed; there may be some intrinsic quality to the qualifier “best,” but that does not indicate that the best action is the only right action. However, when asked how scalar utilitarianism guides our actions, Norcross produces a problematic response: Norcross claims that if an action is good, then I have reason to perform the action. Norcross also admits that if another action is better, then I have more reason to perform that action over the first. It is an obvious conclusion from these two premises that if an action is the best possible action, then I have the most reason to perform that action. This is a problem for Norcross, because “has the most reason to perform” sounds very similar to “ought to perform.” If the two statements are equivalent, then scalar utilitarianism does not differ from its standard counterpart. Norcross may claim that the two statements are not equivalent, but I have trouble imagining how the distinction may run.

Norcross rejects the utilitarian standard that claims that the action that produces the most good is the right action. The basis of this rejection is that the distinction between the best action and all other actions is arbitrary. Norcross provides an example that shows that the utilitarian feels indifference between promoting an increase in good that reaches the maximum and an equal increase that does not attain this maximum. However, this is inconsistent with utilitarianism. The utilitarian does not care whether an action causes someone else to reach their maximum, but only considers the net increase in good. With this in mind, the distinction between best and all others may still be arbitrary, but it can be shown that the highest-ranking action possesses an existential quality that no other action possesses. According to Norcross, this gives us the most reason to perform the best action. This sounds dangerously close to the standard utilitarian “ought” claim, and leads scalar utilitarianism right back to standard utilitarianism.

(1) I assume that by “threshold” Norcross means the point at which maximum happiness is produced. This may not be correct, since Norcross thinks that giving 11% would be a supererogatory act, while the utilitarian claims this action is wrong because it produces less happiness. However, I will take Norcross’ use of “threshold” to be consistent with utilitarianism.
(2)Though if we lump the first three into one award as Norcross suggests, the runner in first place may have some legitimate complaints.
(3) E is intended to represent the existential quantifier; it should be backwards but Nexopia does not allow such symbols.

I welcome any direct commets or messages.

Substance dualism splits events into material and mental categories. These categories are distinct, and under the Cartesian view of dualism, the material and the mental interact with each other in clear causal ways. If I stub my toe, I will feel pain, and if I feel a desire to eat, I will find food. This seems plausible at first glance. Unfortunately, we also have a well-established notion that the material world is causally closed; every event in the material world is caused by another event in the material world. This is clearly inconsistent with Cartesian dualism. Parallelism and Occasionalism are forms of substance dualism that eliminate the need for interaction, avoiding the problem of causal closedness. However, both versions raise additional worries. I intend to briefly describe Parallelism and Occasionalism, and to provide arguments for their deficiencies as theories of mind and body. The remainder of the paper focuses on the more radical theory of Idealism. Idealism ignores the problem of causal closedness by claiming that there is no material world. I intend to discuss various arguments for and against Idealism. I will also cover Robinson’s defence of Berkeleian Idealism, which I find unsatisfactory.

There are two important components of dualism that remain intact according to Parallelism and Occasionalism; material substances are extended but unthinking, and mental substances are not extended but thinking. Extension simply means that an object takes up physical space. It seems clear that a rock takes up a certain amount of space, while my sensation of pain does not. An unthinking object is one that does not give rise to perceptual phenomena such as sensation, belief, or desire. While these two components remain crucial, the distinction between Cartesian dualism and other forms of dualism is the notion of interaction. As stated above, Cartesian dualism claims that material and mental substances interact with each other causally. Parallelism and Occasionalism both reject this notion. This may be problematic, since our intuition is that material stimuli cause mental phenomena, and vice versa. Let us turn to Parallelism first to see how this intuition could be an illusion.

Suppose I wake up every morning exactly at the crack of dawn. At the exact moment that I wake up, the sun begins to rise. This leads me to the conclusion that my waking causes the sun to rise. This is quite clearly false; the sun rises because of the rotation of the Earth, not my waking. My waking is perfectly correlated with the rising of the sun, but there is no causal connection. This is how Parallelism operates. The material and mental worlds coincide in such a perfect way that we have the illusion that they are interacting with each other. There are two plausible ways that this may occur; the laws of nature may cause the worlds to run in parallel, or God may play the same role. To make the laws of nature explanation plausible, we have to accept that it is simply a brute fact that the two worlds run in parallel. This may be unappealing to many people, though the objection is not fatal. The notion of God is more interesting. It seems that our notion of God can either be that God is mental, material, both, or neither. The notion that God is mental would restrict God from causing anything in the material world to occur, so this seems implausible. God does not seem to be material either, since it is doubtful that many notions of God involve extension. God cannot be both, because this violates the idea that material and mental substances are distinct completely. The most plausible view of God is that God is neither material nor mental, and created the two worlds so that they run parallel. This is plausible but potentially problematic. First, it clearly relies on the notion that God exists. A more interesting objection is that creation may be construed as a type of causation. If this is true, then God’s creating the two worlds violates causal closedness. Intuitively, it seems that we create things in the material world, and this creation counts as causation. However, it may be more plausible to say that we are rearranging something that has already been created, so the objection is not strong. It seems that Parallelism is at least plausible, but only if we accept the existence of God.

Occasionalism is very similar to Parallelism in that the illusion of interaction is created by perfect correlation between the material and mental worlds. However, the distinct aspect of Occasionalism is that God causes every event in both worlds, making it so they occur in correlation. This does not seem to help though, as it straightforwardly rejects the notion of causal closedness. If God is not material, and God causes every material event, then the causal closedness notion of the material world is simply incoherent. I argue that we have more reason and evidence to believe that the material world is causally closed than to believe that God causes everything. A plausible reply may be that God creates each individual moment as a new world. If we admit that creation is not included in causation, then this is possible. However, it seems very counter-intuitive, since it feels like our lives are continuous, and not a series of disconnected moments. This is far from a fatal problem though. A similar phenomenon seems to occur as we watch a film; the still-frame clips occur in such rapid succession that we perceive a live-action movie. However, the assumptions required for Occasionalism to be plausible are very radical, and though the theory may be coherent, it seems unacceptably post hoc. As is the case with Parallelism, Occasionalism also relies on the notion that God exists.

It seems that dualism without interaction may be possible as long as we admit that God exists. Even so, it requires some radical assumptions, and it may be a very weak theory of mind and body on these grounds. Another way to avoid the problem of causal closedness is to reject the notion that there is a material world at all. This is the aim of Idealism. The basic structure of the Idealist argument is that the illusion of a physical world is the result of activity in our minds. None of our perceptions or sensations have physical origins, but they are instead mental objects. This seems clearly plausible, though extremely counter-intuitive. A common and immediate objection is that objects continue to exist even when we do not perceive them. However, this is an extremely weak objection, if not an entirely invalid objection. First, we have no idea that objects continue to exist if we do not perceive them. It is impossible for us to check without perceiving them, so it seems like a fruitless endeavour. Furthermore, the objection seems question-begging. The argument has the form: there are material objects that exist outside of our mental perception; therefore there is a material world. The assumption that there are material objects at all is fatal to the objection. As a short aside, an objection I have to Idealism is that it is a very weak theory. There does not seem to be any evidence or argument that can be presented against Idealism. Some may take this to mean that the theory is very strong, but consider an example: psychic mediums claim that they can speak with ghosts, but they also claim that the negative vibes of a sceptical researcher prevent communication. The theory cannot be proven wrong, but we are thwarted in attempting to find evidence. This seems problematic to me. This is not fatal to Idealism, but provides reason to choose a stronger theory over Idealism.

A plausible objection to Idealism is that our perception of the physical world involves a certain ordered quality, and this requires an explanation that Idealism cannot provide. Robinson defends Idealism against this argument, though arguably not very well. Robinson’s first defence is against Scepticism, and it is unfortunately very inconclusive. Sceptics argue that we do not require an explanation at all, since it is entirely possible that a seemingly ordered sequence of events can clearly occur as a result of randomness. Suppose I set up a random number generator to produce 10 numbers between 1 and 10. There is a very small chance (1 x 10 to the power of -10) that the resulting sequence will be numerically ordered from 1 to 10. The Sceptic argues that the same could be true of our world. Robinson provides an objection, but it is hopelessly unsuccessful. It may be easier to say that Scepticism is possible, but the probability that it is true is abysmally low. What the Sceptic may need to strengthen her argument is an occurrence that seems to violate temporal order, suggesting randomness. As of yet, this has not occurred. Robinson goes on to refute Naive Realism and Representative Realism, which seems unnecessary, since he leaves a large number of theories contrary to Idealism standing. However, an argument he poses against Naive Realism is interesting in regards to its consequences on Idealism. Naive Realism is the view that we perceive the physical world accurately, and this is what produces our sensations and perceptions. Robinson’ argument is as follows :
(1) It is possible for brain activity to cause a hallucination.
(2) It is necessary the give the same account of a hallucination
and an experience if they have the same brain activity.
/ Therefore features of the external world are not the only
causes of sensations and perceptions.
This seems to be a valid and fatal objection to Naive Realism, but it also seems contrary to Idealism. If we rely on the necessity of identical brain activity resulting in the same account, it does not seem plausible to then say that there are not real brain activities as the Idealist does (1).

Robinson finally produces a possible explanation for the order of our perceptions, but it is not very satisfying. Robinson claims that the necessary premise for the Idealist argument is that God produces the order. We immediately encounter the same problems as we do with Parallelism and Occasionalism. The reliance on the existence of God weakens Idealism to a degree that I cannot accept.

Cartesian dualism encounters the troublesome problem that the material world is causally closed. It seems impossible that the mental and material worlds could possibly interact. Parallelism and Occasionalism avoid this problem by rejecting the notion of interaction. However, Parallelism and Occasionalism produce problems of their own. The only plausible constructions of Parallelism and Occasionalism rely heavily on the notions that creation is not a type of causation and on the existence of God, or blind acceptance of Parallelism. These required assumptions weaken the theories greatly. Idealism avoids the problem of causal closedness by rejecting the notion of a material world. Idealism is made weaker by the fact that there is very little evidence that can be presented against the theory, making it unfalsifiable. Some may see this as a strength, but it remains that while we do not have evidence against Idealism, we do not have evidence for Idealism. Idealism also raises issues concerning the ordered quality of our perceptions. The Sceptic argues that an explanation is not necessary, though this makes the probability of Scepticism being correct extremely low. Robinson posits God as the cause of the ordered quality of perception, but this again relies on the existence of God. I find Parallelism, Occasionalism, and Idealism to be plausible, but too weak to merit complete acceptance

(1) Note that empirical evidence suggests that the brain activity would be significantly different; the hallucination does not involve any activity in the primary visual cortex, while the real sight does.

If you are not familiar the Trolley Problem, please see the brief description on my profile. I welcome any comments or messages.

Thomson believes that by pulling the switch in the Trolley case and by killing the donor in the Transplant case, you have violated the rights of the one. However, Thomson approves of your action in the Trolley case and disapproves of your action in the Transplant case. Though both cases involve a rights violation, Thomson presents two principles that, when adhered to, permit you to violate the rights of the one to save the five in the Trolley case but not in the Transplant case. Thomson’s first principle is that you must not introduce a new threat to the one, but instead you must redirect the threat that threatened the five to the one. In the Transplant case, the one is threatened by you killing her, not by organ failure like the five. In the Trolley case, you merely redirect the threat of the trolley from the five to the one. Thomson’s second principle is that the means by which you save the five must not violate any serious rights of the one. This protects Thomson from allowing you to push the one into the Trolley to save the five, even though the threat is the same. I intend to show that the cases can be altered in ways that cause the first principle to produce undesirable results for Thomson. I also intend to show that the Trolley case fails the second principle, forcing Thomson to reject it. In addition, I will briefly outline a new solution to the problem based on implicit consent that Thomson endorses. However, I will make it clear that this solution does not allow Thomson to make the conclusions she desires either, but instead allows you to save the five in both cases.

If we are not permitted to introduce a new threat to the one, it seems that we can accept the Trolley case and reject the Transplant case. However, we can construe alterations of the cases to make a move against this principle. Suppose the five in the Transplant case are facing organ failure because some villainous surgeon has produced the faulty organs and has replaced their healthy organs with the new organs. Instead of killing the one and taking her organs, you merely sedate her and swap her healthy organs with the faulty organs in each of the five. It is now the case that what threatened the five, namely organ failure caused by surgical transplant of a faulty organ for a healthy organ, now threatens the one. Thomson must now accept the Transplant case. An alteration of the Trolley case produces the same result. Suppose that instead of changing the track, the switch causes a nearby empty building to explode. You know enough about explosives to be sure that the debris will land on the track and stop the trolley. However, you see someone walk into the building. If you press the button, you introduce a new threat to the one, and Thomson has to reject the Trolley case.

Thomson may be willing to accept the results of the alterations while maintaining that the principle still applies to the original cases. However, it seems more likely that Thomson will say that in both of the altered cases your means violate the rights of the one. It does not seem clear how this works. Suppose I create a new case that I will call the Bullet Game. You are put into a twisted situation by some evil madman in which you are placed in a circle directly across from an unconscious person. There are five other people in the same situation at other positions in the circle. You are given a gun with one bullet and instructed to kill the person across from you. If you do not kill, the five others (all associates of the madman) will shoot the person across from them, one by one until you comply. It seems unlikely that Thomson will allow you to shoot the one. Your bullet is a different threat than the bullets of the associates. However, you are a fantastic shot, and you decide to deflect the first associate’s bullet to the person across from you. The game ends and the five are spared. You redirected the threat (or at least one fifth of the threat) to the one. Thomson may be tempted to say that you fail the second principle; this produces a problem. Your means are to shoot a bullet, and the result is that the one is killed by a bullet. Shooting a bullet does not violate a right itself unless the bullet hits somebody or something. It then seems that the reason shooting the person or deflecting the bullet violates her rights is the result and not the action itself. If this is true, then your means in the Trolley case are not just pulling a switch, but instead you are pulling a switch that causes a trolley to kill the one. Thomson must reject the original Trolley case.

Thomson may endorse an entirely different solution that abandons the two principles and instead bases the distinction on consent. Suppose all six of the people are given the Trolley scenario without any knowledge of which position they are in. Presumably, most people would rather have you pull the switch, since there is a larger chance that they will survive. However, it is very unclear how this produces any distinction between the Trolley case and the Transplant case, since the probabilities of survival are identical. This solution seems to permit us to do anything that will disperse good results to the largest number of people, which is not likely the result Thomson wants.

Thomson’s principles are designed to allow her to permit saving the one in the Trolley case, but reject saving the one in the Transplant case. However, alterations of both cases can be given to change her decisions in ways she does not desire. In addition, the Trolley case already seems to fail the second principle if we take a plausible interpretation of what it is for your means to violate a person’s rights. Thomson seems to endorse an alternative solution that allows us to perform an action is everyone involved would approve of the action if they were unaware of their position in the situation. However, this does not allow Thomson to reject the Transplant case. Thomson’s solutions to the Trolley problem do not allow us to save in the Trolley case while forbidding us to save in the Transplant case.

I am going to preface this paper with a brief explanation of some key points concerning logic. This section is intended for readers who do not have a background in logic, but still wish to read this paper with some level of comprehension. The ideas themselves are fairly basic, but some people tend to get caught up with logic. It is really quite simple once you have a handle on it. First off, a basic “if-then” statement in English is known as a conditional in logic. The basic form is “if x occurs, then y occurs.” In order to determine the truth of such a statement, it is possible to appeal to the truth of the individual parts. If x is true and y is true, then it holds that the entire statement is true. x happened and y happened. If x is true and y is false, it clearly stands that the statement was false. However, the controversy lies in cases where x is false. Current theory claims that this makes the statement true, regardless of the truth value of y. However, this causes problems for statements that involve the past, such as “If Galileo had jumped from the tower, he would have grown wings and fly.” Because x is false, theory holds that the statement is true, but intuitively it seems very wrong. This has caused conditionals to be split into material conditionals, which are the standard conditional, and counterfactuals, which involve false assertions about the past (or contrary-to-fact assertions, hence counterfactuals). If you have a hold on these ideas, the following paper should make sense. Also, some logic symbols I will use translate as follows: ~ means “not,” & means “and,” and > represents an “if-then” statement. I welcome any intelligent comments to be made directly to me.

The truth of counterfactuals is generally ambiguous as far as rational thought goes. Unlike their material counterparts, and most other logical forms, there is no fully defensible way to determine the truth of a counterfactual. This is, of course, problematic, since counterfactuals are often the key form of important arguments, such as “Say we had not invaded Iraq, our economy would not be at risk of collapsing.” One proposed solution is to appeal to the laws of nature in order to determine the truth of a counterfactual, and in some cases, this seems plausible and is simple enough to be desirable. For example, the statement “If the water had reached 100 degrees Celsius, it would have boiled,” is likely a true statement, because of the law that states that water’s evaporating point is 100 degrees Celsius. However, the laws of nature have inherent problems of their own. I intend to dismiss this method of evaluation for counterfactuals based on the assertion that it determines truth values with an unacceptable degree of probability, which may be acceptable in empirical science, but not in rational logic.

The first problem we have to solve is that of irrelevant conditionals. That is, we must determine the truth of conditionals such as “If tigers have stripes, then water is wet.” The two components of the conditional are doubtless true, but because of the lack of relevance between the two separate statements, it seems odd to consider the conditional true. My solution to this problem is simple; such statements can be said to have a truth-value gap, in that they cannot be said to be true or false, because either assertion is basically meaningless. Hence, irrelevant conditionals hold no truth value; they are neither true nor false.

Let us assume that we live in an infinite universe, in terms of space, time, or both. If any one of these possibilities is true, the implications for the laws of nature are bleak. If any dimension of the universe is infinite, then laws of nature are inevitably broken. If space or time is infinite, then everything that is logically possible (so excluding occurrences such as “p & ~ p,” or “x and not x at the same time) happens, happened, and will happen. The use of the word “and” is intentional; each logically possible event does not happen just once, but an infinite number of times. Water boils at every temperature, gravity acts in all possible ways. If Galileo had jumped from the tower, experience tells us that he would not have grown wings and flown away, but it is logically possible. Hence, all events are possible unless restricted by logical impossibility.

The logical method that the sciences use is inherently flawed. The basic form hypothesis-observation science is as follows; if a given hypothesis is correct, then under certain circumstances, a certain event will occur. In terms of logic, it can be basically symbolized as H > (C & E). In order to test the hypothesis, we observe (C & E), or the events occurring under the circumstances, and then claim H, the hypothesis, to be true. This is a logical fallacy known as affirming the antecedent. Hence, knowledge based on observation is logically flawed.

This leads us to a new solution; we can turn to the statistical method of observation known as hypothesis testing. In hypothesis testing, the opposite hypothesis, or the null hypothesis, is tested. The logic of this test makes sense, and takes the form;
1) ~H > (C & E) Premise
2) ~ (C & E) Premise
3) ~~H 1,2 Modus Tollens
4) H 3 Double Negation
However, the method is far from perfect. In order for the null hypothesis to be rejected, the statistical data (remember, it is a statistical procedure) must fall within a zone of the normal curve (also known as the bell curve) that is extreme enough that the scores did not occur by chance. These zones are generally at the 0.5 or 0.1 ranges. This, of course, means that the observation, or the “law,” may have a 0.5% chance of being completely wrong. Hence, even the logically valid methods of observation are not necessarily sound.

Reference to the laws of nature to determine the truth value of a counterfactual seems to hold many flaws, which I hold to be unacceptable. First, because of the infinite nature of the universe, all logically possible events occur an infinite number of times, and therefore there are an infinite number of varying laws. Second, our observation of these laws is based on a logical fallacy. Finally, our logically valid methods of observation have an inherent level of probability, which cannot be accepted in a deductive logical theory. Probability is an element of inductive logic, and counterfactuals are a necessary part of deductive logic. Therefore, the laws of nature cannot be a solution to counterfactuals.

First of all, I'm going to answer the two most common responses right from the start. Yes, I know it is long. In fact, it is the longest essay I have posted on Nexopia, by at least double. Considering how many "tl;dr" comments I received on my essay titled "Why Soft Determinism Does Not Work," this should have quite a few. Also, this IS my work; it is not copied or plagiarized. It is not good enough to be plagiarized. Now to the important items. This essay is (obviously) concerned with Nietzsche's paper "On the Genealogy of Morality." Though there is a summary of his argument included, I urge anyone interested in moral philosophy to read it. It is long and it is a touch complicated, but it is worth reading. Finally, I have not included citations, because I am pasting this from an MS Word document, and the citations are all in footnotes. If you REALLY need to see that the citations, I can send you a copy on request (after performing the poor-man's copyright of course). I welcome any direct comments/messages, in case I miss them here

In his major moral work, “On the Genealogy of Morality,” Nietzsche advances an important criticism of modern morality. I intend to briefly summarize Nietzsche’s argument by first outlining the important aspects of each of his three essays, and then attempting to express his argument as a cohesive whole. The focus of Nietzsche’s work is largely critical, but his positive argument is briefly discussed as well. I further intend to offer five objections to Nietzsche’s criticism, and defend Nietzsche where it is possible. Finally, I intend to speculate about possible alternative solutions while keeping Nietzsche’s criticism in mind.

Nietzsche’s primary objective is to provide a basis for rejecting the dominant morality, which he refers to as the ascetic, or the “slave morality.” Nietzsche’s claim is that we must derive our moral grounds from our human history. Since our current moral theories ignore the genealogy involved in morality, we must completely reconsider our ethical codes. The three divisions of Nietzsche’s paper can be interpreted as a single entity, but first it is important to understand the separate components of each paper, which describe three different aspects of the same problem. His first essay outlines the distinction between two opposing moral codes. One of these codes is the current dominant morality, which involves the opposition between good and evil. The second morality, which Nietzsche advocates, involves only good and bad. The distinction is not only significant, but “good” is defined in opposing ways in both modes of morality. Nietzsche’s preferred mode is the “noble mode,” which defines “good” as the assertion of the desires of the powerful. Consequently, “bad” is simply used to refer to the desires of the weak. The distinction between good and evil is, according to Nietzsche a rejection of the powerful due to the weak human’s resentment (“ressentiment”) towards the powerful human. The “evil” is now defined as the assertion of the powerful. This is what Nietzsche calls the “slave morality,” and it is embodied primarily by Christianity. The argument is based on a fictional struggle between the “warrior” and the “priest,” who represent the noble mode and the slave mode respectively. In Nietzsche’s description, the priest is defenseless and as a result he begins to resent the warrior. The priest convinces himself that the warrior is “evil,” and that he himself, the “good,” will be ultimately victorious in Heaven. In contrast, the warrior merely refers to his enemies as “bad” to mean inferior, or as “worthless,” or “ill-born.” The warrior’s enemies are never “evil,” because this would mean that their opposition posits meaning for the warrior. The weak require some sort of subject to be opposed against, but for the strong, “the act is everything.” Nietzsche also considers the objection that altruism has a use that has been forgotten, and rejects it on the following grounds. First, Nietzsche states that the notion of what is “good” must have been asserted by the powerful in the first place. Second, Nietzsche dismisses the argument by claiming that nothing useful has any reason to be forgotten. Nietzsche concludes the essay by outlining the battle between Judea (slave morality) and Rome (noble morality). The conclusion Nietzsche reaches is that Judea has ultimately won based on the self-indulgent and self-righteous sacrifice of Jesus Christ. Judea has created grounds to call itself “good,” and this is the good that Nietzsche intends to dismiss.

Nietzsche’s second essay is concerned with redefining the concept of guilt, and how it leads to what is called “bad conscience.” The redefinition of guilt begins by stating that humans actively repress their memories. However, Nietzsche believes this must be counteracted in order for promises to be kept, as promises are the key to Nietzsche’s concept of guilt. He defines the idea of punishment as a simple pre-moral relationship between creditor and debtor. The creditor provides something to the debtor, and the debtor is held responsible for repaying the creditor. These promises are necessary for exercising control over the future for the creditor. If the payment is not received, the creditor eventually falls into what Nietzsche calls a “morality of custom,” in which the creditor becomes autonomous and realizes that he can punish the debtor on his own. The transaction is now paid by the pleasure the creditor derives from inflicting pain. Consequently, matters such as responsibility are irrelevant to punishment; it is merely an expression of the creditor`s anger. Nietzsche defends this point by appealing to the etymology of the German words for debt and guilt, which are “schulden” and “schuld,” respectively. The definition of guilt is derived from the concept of debt. A potential objection is to define punishment through its uses, but this does not satisfy Nietzsche. He claims that the utility of punishment and the origin of punishment are and must be separate ideas. According to Nietzsche, there are many uses of punishment, but it is certainly not the case that it causes the debtor to feel remorse for the broken promise. In fact, the opposite reaction is more likely to occur, since it further alienates the debtor from the powerful, creating more resentment. Nietzsche derives bad conscience from this idea of guilt and punishment. The majority of Nietzsche`s philosophy defends the point that we are naturally driven by our will to power, and this drive is prevented by socially instituted moral systems. The assertion of the powerful is turned inwards on the powerful themselves, and this suppression is the cause of bad conscience. Nietzsche concludes the essay with his positive contribution to morality; counteraction must be taken against the suppression of the powerful and against bad conscience. The psychological self-tortures involved in bad conscience can be turned against the sickness (or weakness) itself. It is not very clear how bad conscience can be turned against itself, but Nietzsche claims it involves the “immersion, burial, and absorption in reality.” In fully accepting the existence of all the obstacles in the way of the will to power, bad conscience can be defeated. However, Nietzsche does not believe that such a Zarathustra figure is ready to be created yet. This figure will not appear under a world of ascetic ideals, because it will continuously be suppressed by slave morality.

The purpose of Nietzsche`s third essay is not to determine what ascetic ideals result in, but instead what the ascetic ideals mean. In defining the ascetic, Nietzsche provides himself a basis on which to reject ascetic morals that stem from absurd meanings. There seem to be different definitions of ascetic ideals for different groups of people, of which Nietzsche includes: artists, philosophers, women, physiological casualties, priests, and saints. It seems then that ascetic ideals contain no inherent meaning, but instead they act merely as an attainable goal for various groups of people. In the face of meaningless, ``a man will rather will nothingness than not will.” Of the groups Nietzsche describes, the significant insights seem to be in that of the artist, the philosopher, and in a relation between the priest and the casualty (or the sick). The artist requires an ideal with which to prop himself up with, in the way that Wagner used Schopenhauer to support his own ideals. It seems then that the artist’s interpretation of the ascetic is one of nothingness. The philosopher, on the other hand, searches for a higher spirituality in order to satisfy a level of independence, but in this quest, is trapped in the ascetic ideal. The philosopher upholds the “three great catchphrases of the ascetic idea:” that is, poverty, chastity, and humility. In trying to escape the ascetic, the philosopher becomes the ascetic. The priest is a much more interesting (and much more damaging) case. The priest becomes a “savior” of the weak; the strong cannot possibly heal the weak, so the weak must therefore heal the weak. There are many ways in which the priest “heals” the sick, none of which actually cause the sick to become healthy (or the weak to become strong). There are four of these “cures” that, despite not helping, at least do not exacerbate the harm. The four neutral cures are: the general deadening of the feeling of life, mechanical activity, small joys such as love for one’s neighbor, and the awakening of the communal feeling of power. Each of these cures creates a stasis that ultimately prevents the transition into power. The deadening of feeling destroys the individual’s ambition, and he remains where he is. Mechanical activity has no significant results, and the individual remains where he is. Small joys are trivial, and distract the individual from his goals, and he remains where he is. Communal power dismisses the idea of the individual for the idea of the group, and the individual remains where he is. However, these are all better options that the concept of sin. Sin is, according to Nietzsche, a way of “altering to direction of resentment.” The effects of sickness are turned inwards, and Nietzsche accuses this self-inflicted ailment for being the cause of many of history’s downfalls, such as the witch trials. With this criticism in mind, Nietzsche considers three possible solutions to his problem, and each of these solutions are said to fail. First, modern science is offered as a solution. However, Nietzsche claims that modern science “does not stand sufficiently on its own,” but instead is founded on the same basis of the ascetic. Science is just a modified version of the previous ascetic ideals. Modern historians are claimed to be a solution, but they deny all teleology, which not only makes them ascetic, but they are nihilistic as well. Nietzsche’s largest concern is what he calls the “contemplative ones,” who sit idly praising their own contemplation of important matters without any action. With the failure of all three of these possibilities, Nietzsche reaches one conclusion. We must critique the value of truth itself. If Nietzsche is correct in saying the idealists who oppose the ascetic ideal also uphold the ascetic idea, we run into a serious problem. Knowledge and the truth cannot be attained without appeal to the ascetic; a belief must exist before a science can be created. The final stage of truth is for it to realize truth as a problem for itself, and Nietzsche claims this as the necessary event for the end of the ascetic ideal. The ascetic becomes necessary to fill the “hole that surrounds man,” or the meaningless of man’s suffering. The ascetic saves our will. The solution is for man to refrain from willing nothingness, and eventually be willing to not will.

Nietzsche’s argument as a whole can be best understood when compared to similar, albeit less speculative, critics of morality. According to Brian Leiter, they can be split into two groups: Theory Critics and Morality Critics. Theory Critics believe that morals cannot be described in a theory, because the results are far too general, abstract, and systematic. This is due to the two primary goals of a moral theory, which Leiter refers to as Reduction and Mechanical Decision. Reduction refers to the attribution of one source to all values, and Mechanical Decision refers to a systematic methodology to be applied in all ethical situations. In comparison, Morality Critics focus more on the cultural applications of morality, and this is consistent with Nietzsche. However, Morality Critics differ from Nietzsche in that they believe that a perfect moral theory is possible. Leiter offers two possible conditions of morality, each of which is rejected by either at least one group of moral theorists. The notion of an Incompatibility Thesis states that acting correct according to morals (living a Moral Life) can sometimes interfere with the acquiring of desirable personal goals and goods. This concept is rejected by defenders of modern morality. The second concept is known as the Overriding Thesis, which states that moral considerations determine action over all other considerations. This view is rejected by Morality Critics as well as Nietzsche, as evident in most of his works. If morals have a causal effect on human action, we are, according to Nietzsche, comparable to trees. Nietzsche clearly stands separately from Theory Critics, but he also differs from Morality Critics in important ways. The key difference is that Morality Critics focus on moral interference with what they call the Good Life, which is characterized by merely living well through love, compassion, and other distinctly non-Nietzschean attributes. Good Life is not actually prevented by moral theory, because the Morality Critics readily accept that we do not generally live Moral Lives. However, Nietzsche is far more concerned with the Extraordinary Life, which is defined by the typical attributes of greatness advocated by Nietzsche, namely the will to power and the assertion of life. Since the Extraordinary Life can easily be prevented from occurring by our cultural morality, Nietzsche suddenly faces problems that do not concern the Morality Critics. This distinction is important in objecting to Nietzsche’s overall argument, but first it is necessary to briefly explain morality in the pejorative sense, which Nietzsche rejects.

Morality in the pejorative sense (which will be referred to as “morality” from here on) contains a descriptive and a normative component. The descriptive component is intended to presuppose certain aspects of human agents, but this notion is not particularly important to Nietzsche. The normative component, which can be said to benefit the weak and harm to poor, is a much larger concern for Nietzsche. Simply stated, Nietzsche rejects morality because of the severely negative influence of the normative component on the potential for achieving greatness. Through Nietzsche’s examples of Goethe, Caesar, Napoleon, and especially Zarathustra, it is clear that the strong are those Dionysian figures who maintain a sensuous attitude towards life despite suffering, resulting in power over the self (and often others, though this is not as important). Suffering becomes a key point in Nietzsche’s rejection of morality. Certain aspects of morality can be simplified to opposing Pro Objects and Con Objects, the typical example of these being happiness (Pro Object) and suffering (Con Object). However, Nietzsche believes that this valuation is false. The Pro Object, in this case happiness, does not have any intrinsic value, and the Con Object, suffering, has significant extrinsic value. Suffering, according to Nietzsche’s collective works, is a necessary ingredient for the achievement of greatness, and morality clearly undermines this goal.

The question raised here is how morality actually harms the great, an objection referred to as the “Harm Puzzle.” As stated earlier, morality is “not a threat to the Good Live but to the Extraordinary Life.” With this in mind, it must be considered that Nietzsche is not concerned about how the theory harms the great, but how the culture’s application of the theory does harm. Nietzsche does not offer any further defense, but his response to further objections (objections 3 and 4) can be useful in answering this particular question.

Objection 2 is that the problem is in the moral theory itself, not the concept of moral theory in general. We merely need to correct our moral condition by improving the substance and the application of moral theory to our culture. Nietzsche responds by claiming that the aim of the slave morality is to prevent the strong from acting in order to promote the benefits of the weak. This is outlined in Nietzsche’s distinction between “good and bad” and “good and evil” in the first essay. However, this explanation is generally not accepted, due to its extremely conspiratorial nature and questionable evidence. A stronger response made on Nietzsche’s behalf concerns how well a moral theory can really be applied outside of the world of academia. It seems that if the Incompatibility Thesis is accepted (and there is strong evidence that moral action does undermine personal desires daily), then the Overriding Thesis is likely to be dismissed due to human nature. Humans simply desire too strongly to allow moral decisions to take priority over their goals.

Objections 3 and 4 are very similar to each other. Objection 3 is that Nietzsche exaggerates to importance of morality in harming the strong, while ignoring other important factors such as economy and politics. Objection 4 is a stronger version that accuses Nietzsche’s complaint of being backwards from reality. These critics claim that the lack of morality in the world is what prevents humans from thriving. However, though Nietzsche certainly accepts that humans do not often act morally (or more importantly, altruistically) he is not likely to abandon his view on that basis alone. Nietzsche defines the problem as the belief in the value of altruism and happiness, not the practical application of such values. The potentially great become so distracted by achieving happiness; they prevent themselves from suffering, which in turn eliminates any possibility of strength. In fact, Nietzsche believes that the potentially strong are at the greatest risk for pursuing happiness, in that they “see and hear immeasurably more, and see and hear more thoughtfully.” The strong are able to understand the ascetic more readily (understand the concepts, not that it is a false theory as Nietzsche believes), so they are more likely to fall into its trap. This is also the way in which morality is capable of harming the strong, and this provides an answer to objection 1 (the Harm Puzzle).

The strongest argument against Nietzsche, objection 5, is that our society, if it were to be truly altruistic, would allow humans to thrive more easily. Nietzsche’s response is repetitive and not entirely satisfactory; this world would undermine the necessary suffering that leads to greatness. However, it is not entirely clear that suffering is the only possible path to greatness. This leads us to potential speculation on a new theory.

If moral theory can be accepted in some form, it now seems necessary to consider Nietzsche’s criticism and begin to rebuild our moral theory. Of course, if Nietzsche and the Theory Critics are correct in saying that there is no theory that can be accepted in describing human morality, then there is no need for a new theory. However, we may prepare one anyway, in case the dispute is ever settled in favor of the Morality Critics. It seems clear that the most important aspect of a Nietzschean moral system has to be the achievement of greatness. This is not to be morality in the pejorative sense, because the rejection, as well as complete reversal, of the normative component has to be rejected. The strong must prosper, likely at the expense of the weak. We can imagine a variation of the methods used by the utilitarian theorists, in which instead of maximizing pleasure, we do what is necessary to maximize greatness, creativity, and achievement on a global scale. Nietzsche would certainly accept the notion of maximal greatness, but he would likely object to the universality of the new theory. However, if greatness is taken as a greatest good, it seems unnecessary to posit so much merit to the individual. Though Nietzsche rejects many of the concepts involved in this theory, namely the emphasis on the group and the entire notion of a “greatest good,” the theory also solves many of the problems exposed in “On the Genealogy of Morals.” The slave concept of good and evil disappears, because the weak can willingly enslave themselves to a new God; that is, the promotion of the strong and even the strong themselves. Bad conscience is eliminated, because the strong are free to assert their power without being exposed to the “blessedness” of the weak. Ascetic ideals do not seem to play a role anymore. However, the theory is brief and basic, and this is only at a speculative stage. A complete moral theory is beyond the scope of this paper.

Nietzsche provides solid ground on which to reject morality in the pejorative sense. The slave morality has so far been victorious over the noble morality, and the distinction between good and evil remains dominant. Punishment is currently defined in a moral sense, but Nietzsche claims it to be a pre-moral relationship between creditor and debtor. Punishment is, as a result, merely gratification for the creditor. When the will to power is suppressed and turned inwards, it results in bad conscience. However, this self-destructive state can be turned on sickness and weakness themselves, in order to destroy bad conscience. Ascetic ideals must be dismissed because of their lack of inherent meaning as well as their negative effects on the potential of the strong. The key aspects of Nietzsche`s essays combine to place him in a unique position between the Moral Critics and the Theory Critics, but this position also causes Nietzsche new problems in defending his theory. Nietzsche is capable of responding to objections 1 through 4, but it seems that he cannot be sure of what a truly altruistic society is capable of. This is of course due to the fact that we have yet to know an altruistic society. Finally, it may be possible to compromise Nietzsche`s position and develop a moral theory based on maximizing greatness, but Nietzsche objects to the universality and Reduction involved in such a theory. Though Nietzsche does not provide a complete solution to the problem of morality in the pejorative sense, it certainly seems that there are some inherent problems in the cultural application of such theories.

Oh no, a paper about free will, time to spark a debate (sorry, I`m in a really sarcastic mood as I post this). An oversimplified exposition of the free will probem is outlined in the first few sentences, but as you will see, this paper is largely concerned with defending the truth of premise two. There are arguments concerning premise three (see debates defending libertarianism), but this is not for the scope of this paper. I welcome any direct comments/messages on my page, to avoid missing them here.

There are three premises concerning the concept of free will that are generally accepted. The first premise is a tautology that states that determinism (the theory that all events are caused) is either true or false. The second premise states that if determinism is true, then all events are caused, we have no control over them, and we have no responsibility. The third premise states that if determinism is false, then uncaused events are random, we have no control over them, and we have no responsibility. If all three of the premises are true, the conclusion must be that we are not responsible for our actions, which means that we do not have freedom of will. Ayer’s position is that of the soft determinist: Ayer beliefs that determinism is true, but we still have free will. Ayer’s argument must then be a rejection of the second premise. In the defence of his argument, Ayer offers a distinction between causation and what he calls “constraint,” and he provides various example cases to illustrate the distinction. In Ayer’s argument, constraint prevents free choice, whereas causation does not. I intend to illustrate that his cases of constraint contain no relevant differences between cases of causation. Finally, if Ayer’s position is rejected, it seems necessary to explain why individuals should still be held responsible for their actions, regardless of whether they are actually responsible. I intend to explain the rationality involved in such decisions.

Ayer offers cases of what he considers true constraint, the requirement for which seems to be that our “own deliberations have ceased to be a causal factor ” (Ayer, Freedom and Necessity). Ayer’s weakest example concerns being coerced into performing an action where the alternative results in something negative and unwanted. For example, if you are to perform an action because you are being threatened at gunpoint, Ayer does not consider you responsible. Of course, the determinist does not consider you responsible either, but according to the determinist you lack responsibility even when the threat is removed. Either way, in the threat case, you are still able to make a decision concerning the action. Your deliberation is still a causal influence at this point, so by Ayer’s own argument, this case can be dismissed as mere causation.

Ayer provides stronger arguments in which deliberation actually is removed as a causal influence, but this does not indicate a relevant difference between causation and constraint. Ayer provides two distinct but similar arguments. The first involves being hypnotized and forced to perform a certain action. The second compares a common thief to a kleptomaniac. Both examples make the same move: the deliberation of the hypnotized individual and the kleptomaniac is irrelevant to the cause of the action (there is debate over whether these two individuals really do not deliberate, but as that is a psychological issue, let us assume that they do not deliberate for the sake of Ayer’s argument). However, let us consider the common thief. It is certainly true that the thief considers his options. He considers himself able to steal, and he considers himself able to not steal. This is an illusionary option. There is something in the thief’s character that causes him to make the choice to steal, and this character is caused. Somewhere along the chain of causal actions, there is an action that is not influenced by the thief’s deliberation. As Ayer claims is true with the kleptomaniac (Ayer, Freedom and Necessity) , if the thief does go through a process in order to decide whether to steal, it is irrelevant to his decision. It seems that the only difference between causation and constraint is whether the individual`s deliberation is a relevant causal influence, but since the result of deliberation is caused by the individual`s character, and the individual`s character is at some point caused by an influence independent of the individual`s deliberation, the influence of deliberation is the same in both causation and constraint. If this is true, then we must reject Ayer`s defence of soft determinism.

It is a problem that if determinism is true and we lack free will, then we should not be held responsible for our actions. However, this would likely result in a very unpleasant world. It is sometimes argued that we hold the individual responsible as a deterrence to prevent others from performing the same action. The objection to this argument is that it does not seem just to punish an individual for an action they do not commit, even if the punishment prevents many people from performing the action. However, deterrence does not seem to be the primary goal of punishment. We tend to hold an individual responsible for an action based on how likely we believe he is to perform the action again. In the case of the coerced individual or the hypnotized individual, it does not seem likely that either of them will perform the action again under normal circumstances, so therefore it is not necessary to punish them, though we may still punish them slightly to maintain deterrence. Similarly, in the case of the kleptomaniac, it seems that we can simply provide therapy that will eliminate the influence of kleptomania to prevent theft from occurring again. This is not true in the case of the thief, so instead we punish him to prevent him from stealing again.

Ayer defends a distinction between causation and constraint in order to maintain determinism and free will simultaneously. The distinction between the two is the influence of the individual`s deliberation. This is a faulty distinction, because the individual`s deliberation is determined by character, which is determined by outside influences. Even though we do not consider individuals responsible for their actions, we must hold them responsible if we have sufficient evidence that they will continue to perform an unwanted behaviour. Whether determinism is true or false, in either case we do not seem to be responsible for our actions, and we do not seem to have free will.

This paper is a direct defence of Singer’s well-known paper concerning famine relief (at the time in Bengal, but his argument can clearly be applied in any case). This was actually written in an examination situation, and this is being copied from a pen and paper copy. Please excuse any typo errors, as I proofread the paper once and I do not wish to do so again. As always, I welcome direct comments and messages, since I tend to ignore most of the comments on the article’s page.

Singer offers a number of arguments to defend his position that giving to famine relief is an obligatory action, and not an act of charity. The most intuitive of his arguments is the “pond case,” which I intend to explain and expose as analogous to famine relief. I also intend to raise potential objections to Singer’s argument, and to defend Singer’s position from the objections.

The “pond case” is a hypothetical situation in which you are walking by a shallow pond and notice that a small child is drowning. In order to save the child, all you must do is wade into the pond and pull the child out of the water. Singer believes that regular intuition is that you are obligated to save the child (note that this has been controversial as well, but that particular objection is not to be covered at the moment). Singer also argues that the only relevant difference between the “pond case” and famine relief is distance. Due to the readily accessible methods of transportation, distance should not influence the decision of whether to contribute to famine relief. Singer then concludes that if you are obligated to save the child, you are obligated to contribute to famine relief.

The objections to this argument concern potentially relevant disanalogies between the two cases. One such objection is that other people are able to help in the famine case, but you are the only one capable of helping in the pond case. However, this seems implausible. If we are to adjust the pond case so that a group of people are watching the child drown, the two cases are again analogous. The fact that there are many people around is irrelevant if these people are not helping to solve the problem. Even if there are individuals contributing to a solution (as there are in the famine case) we can imagine a situation in which many children are in the pond, and many people are wading in to save the children. Unless your effort would contribute absolutely nothing to the solution, you ought to help. Such is the case in famine relief.

Another objection is that in the pond case you are solving the entire problem in its entirety, but in the famine case you are only solving a small part of a larger problem. This is a psychological illusion, not a logical disanalogy. The pond case is, like the famine case, a small part of a larger problem. Many children are in a situation in which they are drowning all over the world. It seems unjustified to claim, “I realized that this is only one child, and many are also drowning right now, so I did not save the child.” If this is intuitively correct, then the two cases are still parallel.

A third objection is that you may be sacrificing a morally significant amount of money in the famine case, while sacrificing nothing of moral importance in the pond case (moral significance is a premise in another of Singer’s arguments). The solution to this is simple: you are obligated to contribute the amount that is just below morally significant sacrifice (upon further discussion of this paper, it has come up that if we were to define “moral significance” broadly enough, this would prevent us from contributing a helpful amount; the definition of “morally significant” is, however, a matter of discussion for another paper).

A final objection is that distance really is relevant to the decision. However, you can offer a case in which distance is the only variable in order to determine whether distance matters. Imagine a situation in which you are given the choice to save one of two children by pushing a corresponding button. You cannot see either of these children, and you do not know either of these children. The only information you are given is that Child A is 500 kilometres away, and Child B is only 10 kilometres away. With all other variables held constant, there does not seem to be any reason why distance is relevant to the decision of which child to save (in fact there is no non-random way to make the decision).

Singer offers a simple argument. We are intuitively obligated to save the child in the pond case. The only relevant difference between the pond case and the famine case is distance. Distance is irrelevant to our obligation. Therefore, we are obligated to contribute in the famine case. There are objections concerning other potentially relevant differences between the cases, but counter-examples can be offered to show that they are irrelevant. If the premises that we must save in the pond case, that distance is the only difference and that distance is irrelevant are in fact both true, then Singer’s conclusion is true.

It should be noted that this paper concerns some distinct objections to specific aspects of utilitarianism, and therefore it does not provide any explanation of the general principles of utilitarianism. For now, it suffices to say that utilitarianism is a moral and ethical theory that was popular in the 17th century, but less so now. JS Mill is a good source for additional information. Also, I am indebted to AC Ewing's paper entitles "A Pursuit of the General Happiness" for clarification. Any significant comments should be directly messaged to me, otherwise I may miss them.

The utilitarian view of morals and ethics claims pleasure as the only thing that is in itself good. Many objections are being raised with this particular aspect of utilitarianism, claiming there to be other intrinsically good factors. I intend to defend utilitarianism by offering rebuttals to the proposed counterexamples to utilitarianism and explaining why pleasure remains the only plausible determinant of morality.

Many argue knowledge to be intrinsically good and to have value in addition to pleasure. A suggested example involves two offers: one in which you are offered 50 years of unrivalled happiness, but this happiness is limited to basic pleasures such as eating, drinking, childish games, and lying in the sun. This life leaves you void of any notable intelligence. The second offer gives you 49 years of the same happiness, but this happiness is also derived from means of intelligence, such as literature, art, and love. It is stipulated that the intelligence of the second will not increase pleasure in the future, and that you will not grow bored of the first. The utilitarian would choose the first offer, since it offers an additional year of happiness. Ewing suggests that this is an error, because one would inevitably believe the second life has more value. However, Ewing offers no further evidence supporting this point of view. The utilitarian sees no reason for the knowledge of the second life to be a factor, considering the knowledge has no impact on pleasure. Knowledge is merely a means for pursuing pleasure. For example, consider a trivial piece of information, such as my name. Let us imagine that a stranger meets me, learns my name and nothing more, and we never meet again. Furthermore, let us stipulate that neither of us have any sort of direct or indirect effect on each other. The knowledge of my name does not hold any value to the stranger. It is not morally wrong for me to lie about my name to this stranger, because knowledge is only valuable if it creates pleasure. In a variation of the example, proposed by Ross, there are two worlds that experience equal pleasure, but the inhabitants of one world are much more knowledgeable than the inhabitants of the second. However, the conditions on the first world are much harsher, so the pleasure experienced is the same. Ross claims that the first world is more valuable, but again the utilitarian disagrees. If the inhabitants switch worlds, it is obvious that the knowledgeable inhabitants will flourish in the new world, and the less knowledgeable inhabitants will suffer. The only value of the knowledge in the first scenario is that it increases the inhabitants’ pleasure to that of the pleasure experienced in the second world, just as it dramatically increases their pleasure if they are relocated to the second world.

An additional example involves the concept of a “white lie;” one suggests a scenario in which, when prompted with a question, telling the truth will create unhappiness, whereas telling a lie will create happiness. Some claim that the preference of the individual asking the question, that is, to be told the truth, is a factor separate from pleasure and happiness. However, this is an error. Preference satisfaction is another path towards pleasure. In most cases, the satisfaction of a preference results in pleasure anyway, such as receiving a delicious dinner when you are hungry. There is an overlooked factor involved in the pleasure though; that is the preference, or desire, for the food. If you were not very hungry, eating the food would still be pleasurable. If you had just eaten a large meal, the food may not be very pleasurable. The key is that preference is not separate from pleasure, but merely enhances or sometimes reduces pleasure. For simplicity, let us define the previous scenario further. You are taking your significant other out on a date, and they ask you whether they look good. The truth is that you think they look awful, but this truth would be very hurtful to your date. If you follow the other option and lie, let us stipulate that no one will mention anything to your date; they will believe that they look good, and they will be happy. There are two conditions that must be met in order for the utilitarian to tell the truth instead of the lie. The first is relatively simple; satisfying the preference of being told the truth must produce happiness greater than the unhappiness created by the news. The second is much more complex; and introduces a new problem for preference satisfaction. If you tell the lie, as far as your date knows, you have still told the truth. Your date thinks that their preference has been satisfied, so the same additional pleasure is still produced. In order to eliminate this pleasure, the date must eventually discover that you have lied. However, we have already stipulated that this will not happen, suggesting that the right choice is to tell the lie. As a parallel example, imagine a dying individual who has very concrete funeral desires. However, once they die, these plans are not carried out. The utilitarian would argue that nothing wrong has been done. The preference of a dead person cannot be satisfied, because satisfaction is dependent on knowledge (or belief of knowledge) that the preference has been adhered to. No pleasure can possibly be derived from satisfaction of the preference, so the utilitarian argues that there is no moral obligation to fulfill the funeral plans.

There are many objections to the utilitarian view that pleasure is the only intrinsic good, but the utilitarian is able to produce responses to these views. The alternative factors of morality, namely knowledge and preference, are not good in themselves, but only good as a means towards happiness and pleasure. It stands then that happiness and pleasure are the only available and appropriate measures on which to base morality.

A critical analysis of Boston Globe article "What Makes People Gay?" (2005)

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The nature versus nature controversy has been debated as long as the human brain has been contemplated. The argument is especially important to the field childhood development. Though most psychologists concede that neither nature nor nurture is completely responsible for behaviour, there is still disparate evidence concerning how intense an effect each influence has on a developing human and on specific personal traits. However, a modern nature versus nurture argument is dominant in psychology and politics. Homosexuality cannot be surely attributed to nature or nurture, and the exact influences remain a large mystery. Neil Swidey’s August 2005 article in the Boston Globe introduces an interesting study; the study involves twin brothers, one of which demonstrates typical childhood gender nonconformity (CGN). Thomas and Patrick, which are false names given to the boys for the purpose of anonymity, “began as genetic clones…[and] their environment was about as close to identical as possible” (Swidey 2005, p. 2). Despite the similarities between the two boys, Patrick is a CGN child and is quite likely to develop into a homosexual, while Thomas is a typical young boy. Swidey’s article reiterates the leading theories of homosexuality.

Our current knowledge of the underlying causes of homosexuality is currently constricted to a few sparse facts. Swidey states that homosexuality is not as widespread as popular belief indicates, claiming that “most reputable studies find the rate…to be 2 to 4 percent, rather than the popular “1 in 10” estimate” (2005, p. 2). Laura Berk’s statistic of 3 to 6 percent is slightly higher, but still supports Swidey. The article also mentions Dean Hamer’s famous discovery of Xq28, a gene that is much more prominently shared between homosexual brothers than between heterosexual brothers. Berk quotes Hamer’s study, suggesting that homosexuality may be X-linked. However, Berk fails to mention that research teams, including one from Hamer’s lab, “reported only mixed results” (Swidey 2005, p. 7) in attempting to replicate the study. Both Swidey and Berk mention Daryl Bem’s study concerning CGN. Bem’s theory claims that a CGN child’s tendency towards non-traditional activities “may prompt alienation from same-sex parents and peers,” (Berk et al 2006, p. 210) which may lead to an exotic attraction to the same sex. Berk and Swidey display a similar perspective on the theory, but Berk is critical that the theory cannot apply to lesbian behaviour, as male behaviour is socially acceptable in young girls. Berk seems to support the common “big-brother effect” theory, which claims that the probability of homosexuality increases with each older brother the child has. However, Swidey mentions that though “a male with thee older brothers is three times more likely to be gay…there’s still a better than 90 percent chance he will be straight” (Swidey 2005, p. 5-6). Berk omits this information, producing a bias towards the strength of the big brother theory. Among the theories that Swidey and Berk agree and disagree on, Swidey’s article also introduces a more recent theory.

Patrick and Thomas, as stated above, are nearly identical genetically and environmentally, but still show one prominent difference. This evidence suggests that the cause may be centred on activity in the womb. Swidey quotes psychologist William Reiner, stating that “during fetal development, sexual identity is set before the sexual organs are formed” (Swidey 2005, p. 5). A study conducted in a UCLA lab, also mentioned in Swidey’s article, suggests that imprinted genes may be the cause of homosexuality. If there is an imprinted gene responsible for attraction to females, there may be “something atypical in the copy the twin brothers get from mom,” (Swidey 2005, p. 7) potentially causing one brother to be homosexual, as the imprinted coding will have been lost. The study is supported by a Duke University study that indicated that one of the X chromosomes linked to sexual orientation is in fact imprinted.

Another key aspect that Berk does not mention is the significance of determining the cause of homosexual behaviour. Swidey claims that if a biological influence is found to cause homosexuality, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation will be greatly reduced. Though Berk does not directly mention this benefit, she does indicate the difficulties homosexual adolescents encounter, and she would likely agree with Swidey’s motivation.






Berk, L., & Shanker, S. (2006). Child development. Toronto, ON, Canada:
Pearson Education Canada.

Swidey, N. (2005, August 14). What Makes People Gay? Boston globe.